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IT IS NOT RIGHT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION TO STOP AND
FRISK MINORITY PEOPLE BECAUSE THEY DON'T LOOK RIGHT
L. Darnell Weeden"
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue to be addressed is whether a routine detention can be a
reasonable seizure of a person under the Fourth Amendment where race may
be an unarticulated factor in the police officer's decision to detain, frisk, or
search.
As a general matter, a decision to stop a car by a police officer is
reasonable when she has probable cause to believe a traffic violation has
occurred.' The goal of the Fourth Amendment is to guarantee people the right
to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.'
A temporary detention during a stop of one's vehicle by the police, for only
a brief period, is a seizure of the person under the Fourth Amendment The
Supreme Court has stated that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops
and other detentions of individuals does not depend on the actual motivation
of the police officers involved in the stop or detention.4 Because the Court has
failed to acknowledge that motivation should be a factor in deciding whether
a traffic stop is reasonable under the circumstances, some racial minorities
allege that traffic stops and other detentions are mere pretexts for selective
enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race. The Court
rejected the argument that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop
depends on the actual motive of the officers involved while conceding "the
Constitution prohibits the selective enforcement of the law based on
considerations such as race."5 The Court stated that if an otherwise reasonable
search or seizure of an individual was racially motivated, the constitutional
basis for opposing an intentional discriminatory use of the probable cause
process is the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and not
the Fourth Amendment.6 The Court unfortunately concluded that subjective
intentions of police officers play no role in ordinary probable cause Fourth
Amendment analysis.7
* Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University; B.A., J.D.,
University of Mississippi. I would like to thank James 0. Gardner, Class of 1999, for his
dedicated work and valuable comments concerning earlier drafts of this article.
1. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979).
2. See id. at 653-54.
3. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).






There are good reasons for supporting the idea that police conduct
involving a reasonable suspicion challenge based on race should be subjected
to an Equal Protection challenge. A Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion
analysis should be subjected to Equal Protection standards in order to
discourage selective enforcement of the law where race appears to be the
predominant factor explaining the police conduct."
This article will include: (1) an analysis of the historical use of reason-
able suspicion rather than probable cause as a requirement for detaining
persons for temporary seizures, searches or frisks; (2) A discussion of the
impact the watering down of the reasonable suspicion standard has had on
African Americans and others;9 (3) A brief analysis of race based pretext
traffic stops and probable cause as presented in the Whren v. United States
opinion;"0 (4) A rather pointed recommendation on when to use the Equal
Protection Clause to determine whether a police officer's Fourth Amendment
activity is a violation of a person's right to equal protection of the law.
II. TERRY v OHIO AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONSBASED ON
SUSPICION RATHER THAN PROBABLE CAUSE
In Terry v. Ohio the United States Supreme Court gave express approval
to the rule that a police officer investigating possible criminal conduct may
approach, seize, and frisk a person without probable cause based on reason-
ably suspicious inferences." Before the landmark Terry v. Ohio decision any
detention of the person amounting to a seizure of a person was not valid unless
justified by probable cause. 2 The Fourth Amendment gives a person the right
not to be searched or seized in an unreasonable manner whether he is at home
or on the streets of our cities. 3 The Supreme Court has properly noted that
the right to be protected against unreasonable searches and seizures was
carefully guarded by the common law and not a single right was held more
sacred than the right to be secure in one's person and property. 4 Terry v.
8. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). Miller is a race-conscious congressional
voting district case where the Court held that the government cannot make race a predominant
factor unless it satisfies strict scrutiny. See id.
9. See David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black andPoor Means
Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659 (1994). Being stopped for nothing or almost nothing has
become a common experience for many minorities after the Supreme Court adopted the
reasonable suspicion test in Terry v. Ohio. See id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
10. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 806.
11. 392 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1968).
12. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983).
13. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 8-9.
14. See Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). "No right is held
more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual
[Vol. 21
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES
Ohio was a revolutionary decision because it was always assumed that any
search or seizure without probable cause was unreasonable on its face and
therefore violated both the common law and the Fourth Amendment." The
definition for probable cause was historically applied only to those cases
where a police office had reasonable grounds to believe that a crime had
occurred, was about to occur, or was occurring. 6 Common sense advises us
that police officers do not have to wait until they see a person committing a
crime before seizing her. 7 Since police officers may seize a person before a
crime is committed, basic respect for our constitutional democracy and
personal freedom of movement demands that such a seizure be made only
upon probable cause.'
More than thirty years ago the demise of probable cause as a basis for a
quick stop or search or frisk appeared to be reasonable enough and an
acceptable accommodation of police safety concerns under the limited
rationale and facts articulated by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio. 9 One
could take a very narrow reading of Terry v. Ohio and state that a Terry stop
or seizure based on something less than probable cause can only be applied to
discover weapons which might be used to harm an officer or others.20 If the
Terry stop and frisk theory based on suspicion rather than probable cause was
limited to a search for weapons to protect the safety of officers in their
interaction with people, it may not have generated such a strong protest and
dissent from Justice Douglas.2' A close examination of the facts, from the
perspective of an African American male, may very well suggest that
Detective McFadden's conduct was not reasonable under the circumstances.
I doubt that three white males would have been rather routinely characterized
as planning a robbery for engaging in that great inner city past time of
window-shopping by those who are either unemployed or under-employed.
to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority." Id.
15. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 38. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The infringement on personal liberty of any 'seizure' of a person can only be
'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment if we require the police to possess
'probable cause' before they seize him. Only that line draws a meaningful distinction
between an officer's mere inkling and the presence of facts within the officer's
personal knowledge which would convince a reasonable man that the person seized
has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a particular crime.
Id.
16. See The Thompson, 3 Wall. 155, 18 L. Ed. 55 (1865).
17. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 35 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting). "[There is no war between the
Constitution and common sense." See id. (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961)).
18. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
19. See id. at 25-26.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 35. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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In Terry, the Court said it would examine the conduct of Detective McFadden
to determine whether his search and seizure of Terry was reasonable at its
inception and as conducted.22
A. Facts
Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.' After the denial
of a pretrial motion to suppress, the prosecution introduced in evidence two
pistols and some bullets taken from Terry and codefendant Richard Chilton
by Cleveland Police Detective McFadden." At the motion to suppress
hearing, McFadden stated that while he was patrolling in plain clothes in
downtown Cleveland his attention was attracted to two males, Chilton and
Terry.2 Detective McFadden had never seen the two men before, and he was
unable to articulate a reasonable basis as to what first drew his attention to
these two African American males.26 Detective McFadden testified that he
had served as policeman for thirty-nine years and he worked for thirty-five
years as a detective, with thirty of those years working this area of downtown
looking for shoplifters and pickpockets." In spite of Detective McFadden's
many years of experience observing and watching people, he could only say
that his eye was drawn to these two men because "when I looked over they
didn't look right to me at the time."28 It is interesting to note that in the real
world of a suppression hearing, Detective McFadden did not articulate either
an objective or subjective reasonable basis for directing his experienced
suspicious eye at two African American males. The basis of Detective
McFadden's "some African American men don't look right to me" profile was
never seriously analyzed by the court as a justifiable basis for attaching
criminal motive to their innocent act of walking while black in downtown
Cleveland. What was the profile of people who do not look right to the
experienced Detective McFadden? Do you have to be black not to look right
to Detective McFadden? Is being black and poor or white and poor or brown
and poor a necessary perquisite for meeting the Detective McFadden "they
don't look right" profile? Maybe Detective McFadden thought only middle
class people of color look right to him. Who knows the basis of Detective
McFadden's "they don't look right" observation. After concluding that the
22. See Terry, 392 U.S at 27-28.
23. See id at 4.




28. Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
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black men did not look right, Detective McFadden took up a post of observa-
tion in the entrance to a store 300 to 400 feet away from the two men.29 After
observing Terry and Chilton and a third man, Katz, for ten to twelve minutes
Detective McFadden became even more suspicious that the men who did not
look right were now planning a daylight robbery.3" Detective McFadden
testified that after watching the men survey a store window, he suspected the
two men who did not look right of 'casing a job, a stick-up,' and that he
considered it his job as a police officer to investigate further.3 Detective
McFadden also stated thathe feared that-the men who did not look right to
him might have a gun.32 Detective McFadden followed Chilton and Terry and
saw them talk to Katz, the third man in the alleged robbery scheme in front of
Zucker's store." Detective McFadden approached the three black men,
identified himself as a policeman, and requested their names. 4 When the men
gave a mumbled response to his questions, Detective McFadden grabbed
Terry and patted down his outside clothing.35 As a result of the pat down
Detective McFadden removed a pistol from Terry's overcoat pocket.36
Detective McFadden also patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz.
Detective McFadden found another gun in the outer pockets of Chilton's
overcoat, but no guns were found on Katz.37 All three men were taken to the
police station, where the two men who originally did not look right to
Detective McFadden, Terry and Chilton, were formally charged with carrying
concealed weapons. 38 At the motion to suppress hearing, the prosecution
argued that the guns had been taken as the result of a search incident to a
lawful arrest.39 The trial court rejected the prosecution's argument, conclud-
ing that it would take an unreasonable stretch of the imagination to find that
Detective McFadden had probable cause to arrest these men before he patted
them down for guns.' The trial court denied the defendants' motion to
suppress on the theory that Detective McFadden's experience gave him
reasonable cause to believe that the defendants were acting suspiciously and
should be subjected to interrogation.41 The trial court stated that for his own
29. See id. at 5-6.




34. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 6-7.





40. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 7-8.
41. See id. at 8.
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protection, Detective McFadden had the right to pat down the outer clothes of
these men he reasonably believed to be armed.42 The United States Supreme
Court held that the admission of the guns into evidence did not violate Terry's
rights under the Fourth Amendment and affirmed his conviction.43
B. Analysis
Terry was entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment as he
walked down the city streets in Cleveland." However, Terry's right against
being stopped and frisked on the streets did not offer reasonable constitutional
protection after Detective McFadden's routine police activity concluded that
he did not look right.45 The legitimate power of the police to engage in stop
and frisk tactics should be permitted where they are truly designed to protect
the safety of police officers where the officer lacks probable cause but has a
reasonable suspicion of specific criminal activity.' However, where the
officer lacks probable cause to stop and or frisk a person, but reasonable
suspicion exists for the police to frisk the person, any evidence that is
produced which is not narrowly tailored to support the officer's reasons for
the stop and frisk must be excluded. For example, in the Terry case the
evidence of the two guns possessed by Terry and Chilton must not be admitted
unless the prosecution can prove that the guns demonstrated probable cause
evidence of either an attempted robbery or a conspiracy to commit robbery.47
One must not forget Detective McFadden's alleged real motive in grabbing
Terry and frisking him and the other men was to dispel his theory of a
robbery.4 There was not sufficient evidence to present probable cause for
robbery by the mere possession of a gun. Evidence of the gun must be
excluded because the nexus between the gun and the robbery is too remote to
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 9 (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)).
45. See id. at lO.
46. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24. The Court stated:
[W]e cannot blind ourselves to the need for law enforcement officers to protect
themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may
lack probable cause for an arrest. When an officer is justified in believing that the
individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and
presently dangerous to the officer or to others, it would appear to be clearly
unreasonable to deny the officer the power to take the necessary measures to
determine whether the person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the
threat of physical harm.
Id.
47. See id. at 4. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and sentenced to one




justify the admissibility of the gun in the absence of the probable cause
standard being met. The issue presented in Terry is not simply a focus on
police conduct, but the admissibility of the discovered gun as a result of the
stop and frisk encounter.49 The rule excluding evidence seized in violation of
the Fourth Amendment has been recognized as the main method to discourage
unlawful conduct by the police.50
I am now proposing an exclusionary rule based on evidence seized as a
result of a reasonable suspicion, stop, or frisk that is not subsequently
supported by probable cause of criminal activity at the conclusion of the on
the site police activity. The general rule of law only excludes evidence when
the police officer violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the "suspect"
regarding searches and seizures. My proposal will allow for the exclusion of
evidence where the officer has not violated the Constitution, but has
encountered a person on grounds less than probable cause. For example, if the
officer has reasonable articulated suspicion to believe someone is smoking
crack cocaine, the officer may make an allowable Terry inquiry. If after the
Terry inquiry the officer ultimately discovers that this person possesses
counterfeit United States currency, an offense unrelated to the officer's initial
reasonable articulated suspicion, the counterfeit money could not be admitted
as evidence in a subsequent prosecution of the person for possessing
counterfeit currency. The officer may confiscate the counterfeit currency, but
it must be excluded in a subsequent prosecution because it was discovered
without probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that he possessed
the counterfeit currency. However, if the officer does find crack cocaine
based on his Terry inquiry, that evidence may be admitted because of the close
nexus between the original suspicion and the evidence actually seized during
the frisk.
The rationale for excluding evidence based on a reasonable articulated
suspicion where there is no reasonable connection between the motive for the
stop and the evidence actually seized is to deter police from expanding a
reasonable stop and frisk into a general search for crime by abusing the Terry
inquiry. Experience has taught us that a rule excluding evidence is an
effective means to impacting police conduct." The exclusionary rules also
serve the vital function of preserving the integrity and prestige of the
judiciary.52 The Terry inquiry approved by the Court is not unconstitutional,
49. See id. at 12.
50. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12. See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
51. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12. See also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-635
(1965).
52. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 12. See also Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,222 (1960).
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but when there is not a reasonably close connection between the articulated
suspicion and the item seized the Terry inquiry expands into a "a lawless
invasion of the of the constitutional rights of citizens."53 A ruling by the court
on the admissibility of evidence sends a very powerful message about
constitutional approval of the process. 4 A ruling admitting evidence in a
criminal proceeding has the effect of approving the conduct which produced
the evidence, while application of the exclusionary rule denies constitutional
approval." It is conceded that the exclusionary rule may not be able to stop
police harassment of racial minorities.5 6 However, it is one thing to be
harassed and it is another thing to be harassed and have evidence seized
during the harassment to be admitted in trial when there is no reasonable
explanation for the search but harassment after an initial Terry inquiry.
Courts have a responsibility to protect against police conduct that interferes
with a person without either reasonable suspicion for a stop, or a safety motive
for a brief frisk under Terry."' A justifiable Terry safety frisk must not be
turned to an expansive search for evidence of a crime without probable cause.
When the Terry safety frisk is expanded to a search for evidence of a crime
without probable cause, its fruits must be excluded from evidence in criminal
trials.5"
III. THE IMPACT OF WATERING DOWN THE TERRY
REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD ON THEAFRICAN AMERICAN
COMMUNITY AND OTHERS
In his dissent, Justice Douglas was very hostile to the Terry rationale. 9
Justice Douglas said the Supreme Court in Terry gave the police greater power
than ajudicial magistrate under the Fourth Amendment, and has taken "a long
53. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 13. "Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot and will
not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting
unhindered governmental use of... such invasions." Id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See id. at 14-15. "The harassment by certain elements of the police community of
minority groups will not be stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial."
Id. "The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice found
that 'in many communities, field interrogations ire a major source of friction between the Police
and minority groups."' Id. at n. 11 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLIcE 183 (1967)).
57. See id. at 15.
58. See id.
59. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 38. (Douglas, J., dissenting) "To give the police greater power
than a magistrate is to take a long step down the totalitarian path. Perhaps such a step is
desirable to cope with modem forms of lawlessness. But if is taken, it should be the deliberate
choice of through a constitutional amendment." Id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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step down the totalitarian path. ' Today the police exercise so much power
to stop and frisk in poor inner city neighborhoods the original Terry rules have
all but disappeared.6
Under current Fourth Amendment law, a police officer may detain a
person living in a high crime neighborhood if the person exhibits the evasive
behavior of avoiding the police.62 Police today exercise their power to stop
people and perform searches without probable cause and very few facts to
base a Terry suspicion on, primarily in poor inner city neighborhoods where
a disproportionate number of African Americans and Hispanic Americans
live.63 The terms "inner city neighborhood" and "high crime area" are
synonymous for a number of Americans including some of those who work
in the criminal justice system, according to Professor Harris."
The new look to Terry is mean spirited because its suspicious rationale
allows police officers that don't play by the rules to target minorities because
of where they live, work, and play. Here is how Professor Harris properly
describes the catch 22 burden the lean and mean illegitimate sons of Terry
place on a disproportionate number of inner city minorities:
In many courts an individual's presence in a high crime location plus
evasion of the police equals suspicion reasonable enough to allow a stop
under Terry. African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and poor people are
likely to find themselves in such high crime areas, simply because they live
and work there. If these people choose to avoid the police-a choice they
have the constitutional right to make-the police may stop them. If the
location is not just a high crime area but a location known for drug activity,
the police may go further: They may search the individual, performing a
Terry pat down. In other words, every person who works or lives in a high
crime area and who avoids the police is subject to automatic seizure, and
to automatic search if the crime suspected involves drugs. Due to the
disproportionately high number of African Americans and Hispanic
60. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
61. See Harris, supra note 9, at 659.
62. See Harris, supra note 9, at 674. See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 363 So. 2d. 699, 703 (La.
1978) (existence in a high crime area and change in speed of movement equals reasonable
suspicion); see also State v. Williams, 416 So. 2d 91 (La. 1982) departing from the vicinity
upon seeing the police in a high crime equals reasonable suspicion); State v. Rice, 795 P.2d 739,
741-42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (reasonable suspicion was created when the defendant was found
in a high crime area where shots were fired and the defendant appeared to be thinking about
running away).
63. See Harris, supra note 9, at 677.
64. See Harris, supra note 9, at 677. "African Americans and Hispanic Americans make
up almost all of the population in most of the neighborhoods the police regard as high crime
areas." Harris, supra note 9, at 677-78.
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Americans living in those areas, they are subject to this treatment much
more often than are whites.
65
You may recall that Detective McFadden stated that the suspects in Terry
caught his attention initially because they did not look right.6 The African
American experience demonstrates a long history of police officers seizing
and frisking African Americans without the benefit of either probable cause
or reasonable articulated suspicion before Terry.67 Today, successful African
Americans like Dean Williams at Ohio State University Law School share
their experience of having encountered unreasonable stops and seizures many
years before the Terry decision.68 While reading the Terry decision as a law
student in 1968, Dean Williams recalled the police abuse he witnessed his
father experience from a black police detective in Muncie, Indiana, in 1956.69
Dean Williams' understanding of the facts gave him a familiar black
experience chill of knowing that his father had been stopped, abused, arrested,
and jailed for seven days on a Muncie street without reasonable suspicion.7"
Professor Harris states that the Supreme Court's ruling in Terry gave
legitimacy to a standing police practice of seizing and searching African
Americans with very little evidence.7
Being stopped for little or nothing has been a common part of the African
American experience ever since we entered this country under less than ideal
circumstances. Throughout our history African Americans have always
known that "race has an undue influence on who is stopped" and searched by
the police.72 Being stopped and frisked, is not limited to being black and poor
because race still has an undue influence on who is stopped whenever an
African American does not look right to an officer of the law. It is not
unusual for the police to state that a person's race influenced their decision to
seize him.73 Not a single case expressly approves race as the only basis for a
65. See Harris, supra note 9, at 680-681.
66. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
67. See Gregory H. Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken Promises: The Gradual but
Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 How. L.J. 567 (1991).
68. See id. at 567.
69. See id. at 567, 570.
70. See id. at 570. "Justice Douglas' concern that the Court in Terry was watering down
the Fourth Amendment and allowing the police "discretion" to seize and search "whenever they
do not like the cut of [a person's] jib was the reality of the world of [Dean Williams'] youth."
Id.
71. See Harris, supra note 9, at 659. n.6.
72. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
supra note 56, at 184.




suspicion stop.74 However, the remarkable occurrence of the suspect's and the
lawbreaker's race appears to be the only factor supporting a suspicious stop.75
In one case a federal appellate court upheld the stop on an African American
male alone in a white Cadillac based on information that a bank several miles
away had been robbed by three African American males in a brown Cadillac.76
It is indeed not wise for race to be a basis of reasonable suspicion because in
many instances if police officers are as honest as Detective McFadden in
Terry, the real reason for a great deal of stopping and frisking of minorities is
they don't look right to the suspicious police officer.77
The courts have consistently considered the crime rate in a given
neighborhood as a relevant factor in justifying a police officer's increased
suspiciousness of a suspect." Professor Johnson believes that the courts have
been too generous in allowing police to describe a neighborhood as a high
crime area for purposes of a suspicion stop.79 The courts should exercise more
caution because the basis for declaring a neighborhood high crime may be
frivolous."0  Some police officers describe all areas as "crime-prone."'"
Portraying a neighborhood as a high crime area will have a hostile impact on
an honest minority person living there. 2 An honest minority person living in
a neighborhood with a large number of criminals increases the chance that he
will mistakenly identified as a criminal by the police. 3 When the police are
allowed to factor in the character of the neighborhood as the basis for a
reasonable suspicion stop they are likely to make more errors.' Professor
Johnson thinks that giving too much weight to the police characterization of
a neighborhood allows the reasonable suspicion standard to be accepted by a
court without a proper probability analysis of the indication of criminal
activity.85 Information that a particular neighborhood has a lot of illegal drug
activity does not ensure that a street exchange occurring in that neighborhood
74. See id, See also United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-887 (1975)
(implying that race cannot be the only basis for reasonable suspicion).
75. See Johnson, supra note 73, at 226.
76. See Johnson, supra note 73, at 226 (citing United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d. 79, 81,
83 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 836 (1976)).
77. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 5.
78. See Johnson, supra note 73, at 222.
79. See Johnson, supra note 73, at 222 & n.42.
80. See Johnson, supra note 73, at 222 & n.42.
81. See Johnson, supra note 73, at 222 & n.42. (citing Racine v. State, 286 So. 2d 890,
894 (Ala. Crim. App. 1973) (approving the description of an upper class neighborhood as
burglary-prone)).
82. See J. SKOLNiCK, JUSTICE WrrHOUT TRIAL 218 (2d ed. 1975).
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See Johnson, supra note 73, at 222 & n.42.
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is more likely to be a drug deal than is an exchange in a neighborhood that has
not been designated as high crime area. 6 In order to justify an increased
probability of suspicion of a particular exchange being drug related, a higher
proportion of street activity in the high drug area (not merely a higher number)
must involve drug transactions. 7 With little or no probability of suspicion of
crime, other than living in a high crime area and avoiding police, the criminal
justice system treats African Americans and Hispanics as inherently suspect
if they give the slightest indication of evading contact with police officers in
their economically disadvantaged neighborhoods.
Terry started out with a goal of focusing upon the governmental interest
which justifies official governmental intrusion into the constitutionally
protected interests of private citizens. 8 There is no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the government's need to search and
seize against the invasion caused by the search or seizure." The Terry court
assured us that such an intrusion based on suspicion without probable cause
could not be taken without specific facts that reasonably warrant the
intrusion." However it is not rational and reasonable to infer suspicion of
criminal activity based on where a person lives and her neighborhood
instinctive desires to avoid all strangers including the police. The neighbor-
hoods where minority and poor people live, which are habitually described by
the police as either high crime, high drug, or both, are sometimes tough places
to be and local residents generally avoid all strangers as a matter of survival-
including police officers they do not know. Honest people who reside in low-
income inner city neighborhoods tend not to avoid police officers they know
and trust.
As a law student more than thirty years ago Dean Williams believed that
the Terry opinion indicated that the Supreme Court had adopted a reasonable
suspicion balance of interest test because it was seriously concerned about
police practices which often rode over the individual rights of minorities."
However, by 1991 as a law professor at the University of Iowa, Dean
Williams would write as early as 1972 in the case of Adams v. Williams, the
Supreme Court started back-tracking on the minimal stop and frisk require-
ments of Terry, but also indicated that factors like race and high crime area
could be used to meet the reasonable suspicion standard.9 I agree with Dean
86. See Johnson, supra note 73, at 222 & n.42.
87. See Johnson, supra note 73, at 222 & n.42.
88. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-21.
89. See id. at 21 (citing Camera v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-535, 536-537
(1967)).
90. See id.
91. See Williams, supra note 67, at 576.
92. See Williams, supra note 67, at 576 (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)
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Williams' statement that Adams was a very problematic decision because of
a "total absence of discussion of any of the effect that diluting Terry might
have on America's minority communities."93 Professor Harris believes that
the dilution of Terry has given the police so much discretion to stop and frisk
that the police may have declared open season on poor African Americans and
Hispanic Americans who live in the inner city." Dean Williams, a former
deputy sheriff and Chair of the Iowa Law Enforcement Academy Council'"
expressed the concerns of many African Americans when he said:
[W]hite America fails to understand that the black community has just as
strong a desire to root out crime and violence as any other community....
However, what the general public and often the police do not understand
is that, despite everyone's need to curb crime, it must be undertaken fairly,
evenly and impartially."
I believe that crime cannot be curbed fairly or impartially if the racial
identity of a person is allowed to be used to increase the suspicion that a
person has engaged in criminal activity.
IV. PRETEXT TRAFFIC STOPS AND THE RATIONALE OF WHREW
A. Facts
Plain clothes policemen patrolling a "high drug area" in an unmarked car
watched a truck driven by defendant Brown waiting at a stop sign at an
intersection for an unusually long time.' The truck turned suddenly, without
signaling, and sped off at an "unreasonable speed." The officers stopped the
truck to warn the driver about traffic violations, and upon approaching the
truck saw plastic bags of crack cocaine in defendant Whren's hands.
Defendants were arrested." Before the trial on federal drug charges,
defendants moved for suppression of the evidence, contending that the stop
and United States v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726 (5th Cir. 1979) (indicating that race, combined with
other factors, has been used by many courts as a basis for raising the level of suspicion of
criminal activity)).
93. See Williams, supra note 67, at 577. Justice Marshall attacked the Adams decision as
a betrayal of the balance that Terry struck between a citizen's right to privacy and his
government's responsibility for effective law enforcement and expanding the concept of
warrantless searches far beyond anything previously recognized as legitimate. See Adams, 407
U.S. at 154-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. See Harris, supra note 9, at 677.
95. See Williams, supra note 67, at 588.
96. See Williams, supra note 67, at 588.




had not been justified by either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
believe defendants were engaged in illegal drug-dealing activity, and that the
officers' traffic-violation justification for approaching the truck was
pretextual. The motion to suppress was denied and both African American
defendants were convicted.99 The Court held that temporary detention of a
motorist based upon probable cause to believe that he has violated a city's
traffic laws does not violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable seizures, even if a reasonable officer would not have stopped the
motorist without other law enforcement objectives."°
B. Analysis
The defendants conceded that the officer had probable cause to believe
that certain provisions of the District of Columbia traffic laws had been
violated."' The defendants' argument that police may use minor traffic
violations as a pretext for obtaining evidence of violation of penal laws was
rejected by the Court in the opinion delivered by Justice Scalia.'02 Where
probable cause exists the Supreme Court only engages in the fourth balancing
of interest analysis in cases involving searches or seizures conducted in a
manner very harmful to an individual. An out-of-uniform officer making a
traffic stop does not remotely qualify as such an extreme practice. °3 The
Court concluded that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does
not depend on the actual motivations of the individuals officers involved and
the Constitution does not allow selective race based enforcement of the law."°
C. Equal Protection Remedy for Race Based Pretextual Traffic Stops
Justice Scalia, speaking for a unanimous Court, was pretty straightfor-
ward in advising litigants that the constitutional basis for objecting to
intentionally discriminatory laws is the Equal Protection Clause and not the
Fourth Amendment."5 In race-conscious voting in majority/minority districts
the Court has held that a state acts unconstitutionally if its conduct is
"unexplainable on grounds other than race."'" When it is clear that the police
officer's denial of a person living in a majority/minority high crime district of
99. See id. at 806.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 810.
102. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 807.
103. See id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)).
104. See id. at 813.
105. See id at 813.
106. See Shaw y. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
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her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures is
unexplainable on any basis other than race, the Court must find that the officer
has acted unconstitutionally.
V. CONCLUSION
Those who believe that the only reason for avoiding the police is to
escape crime are viewing a distorted picture according to Professor Harris.'°7
The post-Terry cases give the impression that minorities living in the inner
city avoid police only to escape apprehension for a crime." s
After all, the cases all end in a seizure of some evidence, which seizure
the defendant then contests as unconstitutional. These opinions, however,
represent only one part of the universe of cases in which people are stopped
because they avoided the police. The point is that while people may avoid the
police for a variety of reasons, reported cases focus only on those with guilty
motivations. Others who are without guilt are nevertheless stopped and
frisked. They are not charged because the search yields no evidence and no
reported case ever results."°
It is simply not true that the trained police eye only stops and frisks those
with illegal contraband or those engaged in illegal activity. Many innocent
minorities are stopped and frisked and never ever go to a criminal court
because there was no evidence to be seized or evidence of criminal activity.
Unfortunately, many innocent minorities suffer the fate of travel agent Patricia
Appleton."' Appleton traveled quite a bit as a travel agent. For a long time
she did not think much of it when U.S. Customs Service inspectors routinely
frisked her and searched her bags when she returned home to Chicago from
several vacations to the Caribbean."' Appleton's attitude regarding the
routine nature of the stops and searches changed in February, 1997, after being
stripped-searched at the Chicago O'Hare International Airport.' 2  In
Appelton's case there is no illegal evidence to suppress at a motion to
suppress hearing because this innocent African American is not a criminal, but
had been treated like one. Appelton is, one of about 85 African American
Women suing the Customs Service in federal court on the theory they were
strip-searched at O'Hare simply because they were black." 3 Critics contend
107. See Harris, supra note 9, at 679.
108. See Harris, supra note 9, at 679.
109. See Harris, supra note 9, at 679.






that the searches at O'Hare are the result of a pattern of racial profiling that
law enforcement illegally uses to stop blacks and other minorities in airports,
on highways, and at other public places just because they look like they don't
belong."4
The courts and commentators have come to accept race as a factor in
deciding a criminal profile for law enforcement officers. "The problem is that
if race is one of the criteria, it can be the tipping point to making the officer
stop somebody," according to Professor Harris."' I believe that race should
never be a factor in governmental decision, whether we are talking about a
race based affirmative action profile or a race based criminal profile. In a
recent ABA Journal/National Bar Association Magazine survey 74.6 percent
of black lawyers opposed race as a profiling factor as a legitimate law
enforcement method." 6
I am strongly opposed to any governmental use of race profiling because
the government cannot be trusted to use race fairly for the benefit of society
as a whole."' What would happen if some of my white colleagues were told
that the mere incidence of their race tipped the scales in favor of them having
a criminal profile for drug use? The scales ofjustice are never balanced when




116. See Gibeaut, supra note 110, at 46.
117. See L. Damell Weeden, Yo, Hopwood, Saying No to Race-Based Affirmative Action
Is The Right Thing to Do from an Afrocentric Perspective, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 533, 543 (1996-
1997). "The time to ensure that race is not a factor in governmental decisions has arrived.
When the government uses race in its decision making process, it is inherently stimulating racial
prejudice because of this country's hostile and polarized racial environment." Id.
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